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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

16 DEC 1970

**Confidential**

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

16 DECEMBER 1970  
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

## W A R N I N G

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 DECEMBER 1970

<u>Moscow (3855 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2983 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Session	(--)	20%	Domestic Issues	(27%)	30%
Warsaw Political Consulta-	(14%)	11%	Indochina	(11%)	30%
tive Committee Meeting			[Air Raids on	(5%)	22%]
in Berlin			North Vietnam		
Indochina	(8%)	5%	Korea	(4%)	6%
China	(4%)	4%	U.S. Rail Strike	(--)	6%
Middle East	(4%)	3%	Japan	(14%)	5%
Luna 17 and Lunakhod	(1%)	3%	Invasion of Guinea	(10%)	5%
Basque Trial	(0.4%)	2%			
Angela Davis' Trial	(0.2%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi has launched a major propaganda campaign calling for vigilance and combat readiness in the wake of the 21 November U.S. air strikes against the North. Hanoi media on 10 December issued an unprecedented joint party-government appeal to "compatriots and combatants throughout the country" which denounces U.S. "serious acts of war" against the DRV and insists that no threat will prevent the North from supporting the struggle in the South. An accompanying order on implementation of the appeal, issued by the Vietnam People's Army High Command, includes a call to detect planes, shoot down and capture many "air pirates," and "be resolved to wipe out" enemy commandos and infantry.

Official Front endorsement came on the 14th with a joint PRG-NFLSV statement--accompanied by an appeal from the PLAF Command--which warns ambiguously that the South Vietnamese people and army "resolutely will not tolerate any venturous U.S. military acts against the DRV."

President Nixon's 10 December press conference, in which he declared that reconnaissance would continue and that DRV targets would be hit if U.S. forces in the South were threatened by North Vietnamese infiltration, prompts further assertions that the DRV and the Front cannot be intimidated. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 12th, by military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant), is particularly abusive, calling the President "the number one American liar" for "expanding on the fabrication" about an understanding in connection with the 1968 bombing halt.

Peking endorses the DRV party-government appeal with a joint party-government statement of its own on the 13th which supports the "sacred duty" of the people in North Vietnam to assist the struggle in the South. And a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 12th juxtaposes an endorsement of the appeal to a denunciation of the President's declaration that the DRV would be bombed if U.S. forces in the South were threatened.

Moscow promptly reported the DRV Party-Government appeal, but there is no authoritative Soviet comment on either the appeal or the President's press conference. Soviet media on the 14th, reporting that Kosygin was given the appeal by the DRV ambassador that day, quotes the Soviet leader as saying only that the USSR will continue to give the Vietnamese "the necessary aid and support." Hanoi media, on the other hand, reported that Kosygin expressed indignation at the new U.S. "acts of war" and expressed "full support" of the DRV appeal.

## DRV LAUNCHES "READINESS" CAMPAIGN WITH PARTY-GOVERNMENT APPEAL

Hanoi's 10 December release of the joint Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee-DRV Government appeal to "all compatriots and combatants" was the opening gun in a concerted propaganda campaign

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on vigilance and combat readiness. Hanoi propaganda following the 21 November U.S. air strikes contained numerous calls for heightened vigilance and readiness, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th seems to have presaged the party-government appeal when, unlike other propaganda, it called on the population at large rather than specific defense forces to maintain vigilance.

Along with the appeal, Hanoi released the order on its implementation from the VPA High Command. It also announced that the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee presidium had held an "extraordinary enlarged session," chaired by DRV President Ton Duc Thang, which issued a statement after studying the appeal. There are reports that meetings are being held and statements issued by various groups and mass organizations in the DRV. Editorial exhortations were published by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 11th and in NHAN DAN on the 11th, 12th, and 15th, and there are at least passing references to the joint appeal in most Hanoi radio and press commentaries since the 10th. The VNA reviews of the Hanoi press say that "much space" is devoted to the appeal and to the "warm response" it has received throughout the communist world. According to VNA, official statements from the Front, Pyongyang, and Peking are carried textually along with reports of comment from Kosygin and other leaders. On the 12th, VNA carried a quotation from Ho Chi Minh which it said was published on the papers' front pages:

No bombs or shells can cow our people and no wily words deceive them. We Vietnamese are resolved to fight till not a single U.S. aggressor is left on our beloved land.\*

The party-government appeal presents a standard bill of particulars to show that the United States is bent on pursuing its aggression in Indochina, is only paying lip service to peace, and is preventing the Paris conference from making any progress. It echoes recent propaganda in condemning U.S. "bombing, strafing, and commando activities" last month and in refuting U.S. statements about an understanding at the time

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\* This quotation appeared in Ho Chi Minh's message to NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, on the occasion of the release of the Front's political program, as carried by VNA on 13 September 1967.

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of the bombing halt that reconnaissance flights over the DRV would continue. It asserts that "arrogant threats of war" and plots for new military adventures against the DRV come from weakness, not strength, and that the Vietnamization policy is not working.

The appeal is directed broadly to the people of the North, exhorting them to boost production as well as maintain vigilance; it goes on to appeal specifically to "people and combatants" in the Fourth Military Zone (the one just above the DMZ) and in South Vietnam, to members of the VWP and of the Ho Chi Minh Labor Youth Group, and to overseas Vietnamese.

Much of the language of the appeal is reminiscent of propaganda during the years of the air strikes against the North, particularly in the insistence that there is no basis for the "illusion" harbored by the United States that it can prevent the North from supporting the South and in the assertion that the DRV is an "independent and sovereign state, a member of the socialist camp," whose territory is "inviolable." On the other hand, the appeal is not marked by particularly bellicose threats or warnings; it falls back on the stereotyped pledge to continue the war of resistance, which it predicts will be crowned with success. It also endorses diplomatic as well as political struggle and says that the correct way to settle the problem is in the PRG's 10 points and eight-point elaboration.

ORDER FROM VPA,                   The order from the VPA High Command  
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN               typically singles out such things as  
                                  defending property, insuring security,  
and maintaining unity among the armed services, the people, and  
the party along with its military appeals. In the latter it  
says the military must shoot down planes, capture pilots,  
"wipe out commandos and infantry," and keep communications  
and transport open "in all circumstances."

Elaborating on the order, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 11th expresses determination to destroy enemy planes--whether reconnaissance or combat, "whether they arrive en masse or singly"--and capture "alive many aggressor pilots." It says "regarding commandos, whether they come from the sky, from the water, or sneak into our country across the borders, we are determined to quickly annihilate or neatly capture them, not to let any of them escape." And "regarding enemy infantry troops, if they set foot on the sacred land of the northern part

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of our country, we are determined to fight them to cut off their retreat and to use the enemy's blood to water our beloved rice paddies."

#### NFLSV-PRG STATEMENT ENDORSES DRV APPEAL TO "ALL COMPATRIOTS"

The Front welcomes the DRV appeal in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th and a LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY editorial the next day. Official endorsement comes on the 14th in a joint NFLSV Central Committee-PRC statement and an appeal from the PLAF Command to all "cadres and combatants."

The joint statement echoes the DRV appeal in saying that in the face of "new U.S. acts and schemes" it is necessary to declare that the Vietnamese nation is one and that the United States must stop its aggression. The statement asserts that the NFLSV and PRG "are resolved to mobilize the South Vietnam liberation armed forces and people to persevere in and step up" their resistance until the United States withdraws its troops and "the puppet army and administration topple." And it warns that the South Vietnamese people and army will "resolutely not tolerate any U.S. military venturous acts against the DRV and crimes against their northern kith and kin."

The statement echoes the DRV appeal in expressing determination to "stand shoulder to shoulder" with the people throughout the country and in Laos and Cambodia, and it warns that "neither impudent threats nor brutal war moves can shake the iron-like determination of the armed forces and people of South Vietnam."

#### PRC JOINT STATEMENT SUPPORTS DRV APPEAL, PRG PEACE PLAN

Peking supports the DRV appeal with a joint party-government statement of its own, carried by NCNA on the 13th. The statement scores the United States for committing "monstrous crimes" in South Vietnam and "barbarous raids and war blackmail" against the North while at the same time trying to "prohibit the Vietnamese people from putting up any resistance." It supports the right of the Vietnamese to defend themselves and the "sacred duty of the people in the northern part of Vietnam to support and assist their kinsmen in the South." It concludes with an expression of firm support for the Indochinese people and the assertion that any U.S. military

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adventures against the Vietnamese people or other people of Indochina are also "provocations against the Chinese people and the revolutionary people of the world."\*

The PRC Party-Government statement was preceded by an 11 December NCNA report--also noted by VNA the next day--that Chou En-lai received the DRV ambassador, who presented him with the DRV appeal. In a "very cordial and friendly conversation," NCNA said, Chou En-lai denounced the bombing as an indication of the United States' "weakness" and "firmly supported" the Vietnamese people in their war. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, carried by NCNA on the 12th, also supports the DRV appeal as a "powerful reply to the flagrant provocations and military adventures" of the U.S. imperialists. It expresses the conviction that if the Indochinese peoples persevere in "protracted war," they will drive out the U.S. "imperialists." It quotes Mao's assertion that the Chinese people provide a "powerful backing" for the Vietnamese people and that Chinese territory is their "reliable rear," and it concludes by reiterating the line that the Chinese people consider it their duty to "support and assist" the Vietnamese people's struggle.

On the 16th NCNA reports low-level meetings of "armymen and civilians" being held throughout China to support the 13 December PRC statement and to condemn U.S. bombing of the DRV.

ENDORSEMENT OF            In referring to the U.S. "pipe dream" of  
NFLSV PEACE PLAN        using bombs to force the Vietnamese into  
                         submission and gain at the conference table  
what cannot be achieved on the battlefield, the statement registers Peking's first endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG peace plans: It says "in their 10-point overall solution and eight supplementary points, the NFLSV and PRG have long set forth the correct way for the settlement of the Vietnam question." The statement gives no indication of the specific substance of the proposals, however. It merely adds that if the Nixon Administration really wants a peaceful settlement it must unconditionally withdraw troops and let the Vietnamese settle their own affairs.

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\* A PRC Government statement on 4 May 1970, assailing the U.S. incursion into Cambodia and the bombings of the DRV, similarly characterized U.S. actions as "frantic provocations against the Chinese people." See the TRENDS of 6 May 1970, page 8.

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In the past Peking has been notably reluctant to even mention the peace plans on its own authority, much less characterize them as "correct." Unwillingness to make such an endorsement was pointed up in joint communiques in October 1969 on the occasion of visits of NFLSV/PRG and DRV delegations in Peking: the communiques recorded the view only of "the Vietnamese side" that the NFLSV solution is the "correct basis" for a settlement.\*

#### MOSCOW NOTES DRV APPEAL, OFFERS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMMENT

Unlike Peking, Moscow avoids authoritative comment on the 10 December DRV Party-Government appeal although on the 14th TASS and the domestic service reported that Kosygin received the DRV ambassador, who handed him the appeal. The brief TASS report--also broadcast by Moscow radio in Vietnamese--said that at the meeting, held in a "friendly and cordial atmosphere," Kosygin promised that the USSR would continue to give the Vietnamese "the necessary aid and support." VNA's report, on the 15th, adds that Kosygin expressed indignation at the new U.S. "acts of war," which he called a "salient feature" of present Administration policy; that he recalled that in their 2 December statement the Warsaw Pact members condemned the U.S. "aggressors"; and that he expressed the USSR's "full support" of the 10 December DRV appeal.

There is only routine-level Soviet publicity for the appeal, and no substantial comment. TASS on the 10th promptly carried a summary of the appeal as well as of the VPA High Command order urging combat readiness, and the summaries were published in PRAVDA on the 12th. Also on the 12th, a TASS dispatch from Hanoi reported that meetings were being held throughout the DRV in response to the appeals. On the 14th, TASS again briefly reported on such meetings in the DRV and mentioned a NHAN DAN commentary supporting the appeal.

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\* For background on Peking's first, belated reference to the NFLSV 10-point solution, see the TRENDS of 29 October 1969, page 9. See the TRENDS of 4 November 1970 for references in Peking propaganda to the NFLSV/PRG's eight-point elaboration.

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Zhukov, in a PRAVDA article reported by Moscow radio on the 14th, notes in passing that the DRV appeal declared that the DRV is an independent and sovereign state and a member of the socialist camp and says that it shows Vietnamese determination to retaliate against U.S. encroachments. The appeal is also briefly mentioned in the course of a 12 December PRAVDA article by Bolshakov on the U.S. step-up of the arms race in general. Referring to President Nixon's "threats" in his press conference, Bolshakov says the DRV appeal stresses that the aggressors will receive a "decisive rebuff" from the Vietnamese people, who are "supported by the countries of the socialist community." This passage, which is picked up in a 13 December VNA report on foreign support, is omitted in the TASS summary of the article.

#### DRV, FRONT SCORE THE . RESIDENT, LAIRD FOR "BOMBING THREATS"

The first monitored Hanoi reference to the President's 10 December press conference came in the 12 December NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast almost 24 hours after Liberation Radio had first mentioned the press conference--first briefly at 0500 GMT on the 11th and in a radio commentary at 1400 GMT that same day. The NHAN DAN editorial is pegged to the DRV party-government appeal and only briefly mentions the press conference, noting that the President said reconnaissance would continue and that missile bases and other targets in the North would be bombed if U.S. troops in South Vietnam were attacked by "liberation troops." More substantial comment came in a "Chien Binh" (Combatant) article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 12th, broadcast by Hanoi radio an hour after the NHAN DAN editorial.

The Chien Binh article is personally abusive, calling the President "the number one American liar" and saying that "his reasoning is very weird"--in demanding safety for the "aggressors" but not for their victims. Chien Binh also says that "Nixon's arrogance has reached its zenith" when he gives himself the right to order attacks against the DRV at any time and any place without even a fabricated justification. The article goes on to say that "militarily, Nixon's scheme is aimed at undermining our economic and military potential and at blocking the North's support for the South; psychologically, the aim of the pattern of staging raids is so that the enemy will be unable to forecast U.S. reaction."

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A 12 December NHAN DAN Commentator article on the press conference is mentioned briefly by VNA English but is not known to have been broadcast by Hanoi radio. However, VNA, in its transmission to Havana for the Hanoi radio correspondent there, quotes Commentator as observing that the President's "arrogant threats" help everyone see his "war madness." Unlike other available Hanoi propaganda, it acknowledges the exchange at the press conference on the issue of release of POW's and says that when "dealing with the Vietnamese rejection of U.S. tricks on the so-called exchange of war prisoners, President Nixon called the Vietnamese people 'an international outlaw.'" On the 12th, Hanoi radio broadcast the text of the Paris DRV delegation spokesman's statement on the press conference which also broaches the POW problem. Among other things, it says that "by his statements on 10 December, Nixon wanted to make believe that the sole subject of the Paris conference is to discuss the so-called POW problem, while stubbornly keeping complete silence on the question of ending the U.S. aggression."

The Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th, like other Front propaganda, is similar to Hanoi comment in deprecating the notion that there was an "understanding" at the time of the 1968 bombing halt whereby U.S. reconnaissance over the DRV would continue. Front propaganda also vehemently condemns the President for declaring that he would order bombing of targets in the DRV if the U.S. forces in South Vietnam are threatened.

HANOI RADIO ON                      Promptly on the 16th, a Hanoi radio  
LAIRD 'THREATS'                      commentary scored Secretary Laird's remarks  
   in his press conference the day before.

Citing "Western news reports," it says he hinted that if the DRV does not show good will at the Paris talks, the United States may resume the bombing of the North; and it adds that he repeated threats that so long as the "U.S. air pirates" are not released, some U.S. troops will remain in South Vietnam. The commentary routinely concludes by saying "Laird's arrogant allegations again unmask the extremely bellicose nature of the Nixon Administration, which is successively resorting to all kinds of pretexts to prepare for new military adventures against the DRV."

PRC DECRIES U.S. "THREATS", DEFENDS DRV RIGHT TO SUPPORT SOUTH

Peking's initial report of the President's press conference--an NCNA Chinese-language report on the 12th, repeated by NCNA in English the next day--singles out the President's remarks on

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bombing North Vietnam. NCNA notes that the President said that U.S. planes, if fired upon, will bomb missile sites and the military complexes around them. It alludes to his comments on DRV infiltration into the South when it says he warned that he would order bombing of "military positions and supply routes in North Vietnam" to protect remaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam "if the people in North Vietnam support their kith and kin in the South."

NCNA also rejects the President's "pretext" for aggression--the claim that there was an "understanding" that reconnaissance flights would be allowed to continue. Maintaining that such a claim is a "lie," NCNA asserts that at a 23 November press conference a State Department spokesman became "tongue-tied" when asked about the understanding. The NCNA report also notes briefly that President Nixon further revealed his "vicious design" when he spoke of the decision to provide 255 million dollars in aid to Cambodia.

The only other available Peking references to the press conference come in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial carried by NCNA on the 12th, which supports the 10 December DRV appeal, and in a 13 December NCNA summary of a NHAN DAN Commentator article. Both items score the President's remarks on the bombing and on the "understanding" in terms similar to the initial NCNA report and defend the DRV people's right to "support" their compatriots in the South.

#### MOSCOW SAYS PRESIDENT'S REMARKS MEAN CONTINUED AGGRESSION

Moscow gives President Nixon's 10 December press conference only routine-level attention, with initial reaction coming in brief items in foreign radio broadcasts on the 11th rather than from TASS. The TASS report, in a departure from customary practice, was delayed until 1833 GMT on the 11th, but it is, as usual, published in the next day's PRAVDA. TASS observes that the President's remarks confirmed a U.S. intention to "continue its aggressive policy in Southeast Asia" despite public opinion and affirmed Washington's desire for "continued aggression" against the DRV rather than for a peaceful political settlement.

TASS says the President declared that the United States would continue the reconnaissance flights and that he would order air strikes against missile sites and military complexes around them if the planes were fired on. Stating once again that

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this is a violation of the U.S. "pledge" of a full and unconditional bombing halt, TASS adds that the President stated further that he would order bombings of such targets as "military objects" in the DRV, mountain passes leading to South Vietnam, and military communications if he concluded that "there is a threat to the remaining U.S. troops in South Vietnam."

The TASS dispatch, like Vietnamese communist reaction, does not mention the President's comments on a cease-fire. But an English-language radio report does say he "rejected the proposal to extend the Christmas cease-fire in South Vietnam," neglecting to mention that he pointed out that it was the DRV which turned down the proposal.

Followup comment acknowledges little of the substance of the President's statements in denouncing his "threats" against the DRV. A PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov, summarized by Moscow radio in English to North America on the 14th, asserts that the President's "threats" to resume the bombing of North Vietnam came as the climax of a "mounting propaganda campaign" begun at the time of the 21-22 November bombings and the airborne operation at Son Tay. The raids, Zhukov says, aroused the indignation of the socialist countries, which expressed their solidarity with the DRV in the 2 December Warsaw Pact statement. Zhukov maintains that the only way out of the impasse for the United States is to "jettison the Dulles policy of strength and find a solution to the problem by peaceful negotiation" leading to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and an opportunity for the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs.

A 14 December domestic service commentary by Zorin refers to statements by Secretary Laird as well as by the President and says it seems that Washington "has taken decisions fraught with many complications in the international situation." On 12 December TASS reported the "stormy debate" in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings at which Senators Fulbright and Symington criticized the President's remarks as indicating further escalation. TASS added that Secretary Laird, testifying before the committee, again affirmed the Administration's intention to carry out bombings "in case of necessity." A 13 December PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko and a TASS commentary the next day say Laird goes even further than the President, threatening to use "the lack of progress at the Paris talks" as a "new excuse" for bombing.

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On the 15th TASS promptly reported Secretary Laird's press conference announcement that day of his intention to visit Southeast Asia in January to review the progress of Vietnamization, the military situation, and the military aid programs. TASS commented that the trip appears to be connected with U.S. plans for "continued aggression" in Southeast Asia, saying Laird declared that the United States intends to continue its military presence in Vietnam. TASS also noted briefly that Laird "again attempted to justify" the bombing raids and the commando operation.

#### PARIS TALKS: ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR RELEASE OF POW'S IGNORED

The VNA and LPA accounts of the 94th Paris session on 10 December note that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh denounced the United States for "carrying out a war of extermination" in her statement, which was largely devoted to alleged U.S. chemical warfare. VNA notes that DRV representative Xuan Thuy took exception to U.S. charges that the DRV is not interested in negotiating at Paris. Stating that the DRV and PRG governments have sent their delegates to Paris with "good will and serious intent," Thuy charged that if the conference has made no progress it is because the Nixon Administration has withdrawn its troops "only with calculated slowness" and refuses to announce a time limit for withdrawal and "to give up the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration."

VNA gives no indication of the nature of the allied proposal for the immediate release of all North Vietnamese prisoners held in the South in exchange for GVN, U.S., and other allied prisoners. The account merely says the U.S. and GVN delegates put forth "the question of 'exchange of POW's' in an attempt to cover up their abominable crimes." It does report Mme. Binh's acknowledgment and rejection of Ambassador Bruce's suggestion that meetings on the POW question begin the next day so that immediate progress could be made. VNA says that "concerning the 'proposal' of the U.S. and GVN delegates "for the discussion tomorrow, December 11, of the so-called question of 'exchange of prisoners of war,'" Mme. Binh stated that the question of prisoners could be discussed "today" if the United States would agree to a troop withdrawal before 30 June 1971. Noting Xuan Thuy's additional comment on the question, it says he "denounced the U.S. and Saigon delegates' perfidious scheme in their proposal on the so-called question of POW's which is only aimed at covering up the U.S. crimes of aggression."

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CEASE-FIRE VNA notes that after delivering her prepared statement Mme. Binh read a declaration on cease-fire, but the account offers no explanation of why it was presented and thus does not indicate whether it was related to calls in the United States for an extended cease-fire over the holidays. The declaration was essentially a restatement of the two basic points of the PRG proposal--on U.S. agreement to withdraw by 30 June 1971 and the formation of a provisional coalition government by the PRG and a Saigon administration without Thieu-Ky-Khiem--along with her assertion that in those events there would be cease-fires with the United States and the ARVN, respectively.

DRV delegate Xuan Thuy, according to VNA, declared "full support" of Mme. Binh's statement on the cease-fire question.

#### CHEMICAL WARFARE SCORED AT PARIS TALKS, SCIENTISTS' MEETING

At the Paris session on 10 December Mme. Binh devoted her formal statement almost exclusively to a denunciation of the U.S. "war of extermination," particularly chemical warfare, presenting detailed statistics to document her case. Xuan Thuy also devoted a considerable portion of his statement to chemical warfare, but the extent of his remarks is not reflected in the VNA account, which says only that he condemned U.S. chemical warfare in South Vietnam and called for an end to the war that is "the origin of all crimes."

The communist delegates did not mention the international conference of scientists held in Paris from 12 to 14 December, but it seems likely that their diatribes were made with the conference in mind. There were DRV and PRG delegations at the conference, and Vietnamese communist media on the 12th publicized messages to the conference from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat.

VNA coverage of the conference includes a report on the 15th that a resolution was adopted "pointing to the great harm caused" by U.S. chemical warfare in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th, as reviewed by VNA, claims that the results of the conference are a very strong condemnation of "the warmongering and barbarous U.S. imperialists" and a "new political setback" for the Nixon Administration.

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USE OF CHEMICALS  
IN QUANG BINH

On 14 December Hanoi released a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which charges that on the 6th the United States "sent a formation of aircraft to drop noxious chemicals on a populated area in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province," causing "much damage to the crops and animals."\* The spokesman "sternly condemned this barbarous crime" and demanded that the United States cease "all acts of war" against the DRV.

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\* A 27 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, protesting alleged U.S. strikes against the DMZ, had charged that U.S. aircraft spread toxic chemicals on Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, Vinh Son, and Vinh Thanh villages on 25 August, "poisoning many people." See the TRENDS of 2 September 1970, page 14.

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## GERMANY AND BERLIN

### GDR STRESSES WEST BERLIN STATUS AS "SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITY"

East German authoritative statements--highlighted by Ulbricht's 9 December speech at the 14th SED Central Committee plenum--stress repeatedly that it is important now, during the four-power talks on West Berlin, that NATO and Bonn in particular end "provocative acts" aimed at changing the "international" status of the "separate political entity" of West Berlin.

Ulbricht hewed to the Warsaw Pact line on the Berlin settlement issue. "In complete conformity" with the 2 December statement on European security issued by the Pact's Political Consultative Committee, he placed the GDR on record as hoping the four-power talks on West Berlin would produce a mutually acceptable agreement "which is in accord with the interests of detente as well as with the needs of the West Berlin people and the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the GDR." The formulation in the Pact statement--that an accord must meet the wishes of the West Berlin population and the interests of the GDR--had in turn been a paraphrase of Brezhnev's observations in Yerevan on 29 November.

Ulbricht prefaced his remarks on a possible Berlin settlement with a reference to the GDR proposal of 29 October for an exchange of views with the FRG. "If the FRG Government were to end its unlawful interference as a state in West Berlin," he said, "the way would be clear for a GDR-FRG agreement on reciprocal transit traffic." He added that such an agreement would have a positive effect on the four-power talks.

In apparent allusion to the recent traffic tie-ups around West Berlin, Ulbricht followed his remarks on a Berlin settlement by taking note of the "tremendous noise" in the "imperialist" press in connection "with transit traffic across GDR communication lines." He observed that West German goods and people can reach the city only via the GDR's communication lines, and he concluded that the GDR "is in various ways interested in the transit of goods and persons via FRG communication lines."

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Ulbricht had last treated the Berlin question at length in an 8 November interview over GDR radio and television. He did not mention the four-power talks on that occasion,\* confining his remarks to FRG-GDR and GDR-West Berlin relations. On the matter of talks between the FRG and GDR, he reaffirmed GDR readiness--"provided there is a cessation of any activity by other states in West Berlin that runs counter to the status of that city under international law and that violates the interests of the GDR and other socialist states"--to resume talks "on questions concerning the transit of mutual passenger and goods traffic." In this formulation, he added, "every word has its weight."

As if to make it clear that the FRG-GDR talks do not involve the question of access routes to West Berlin, Ulbricht went on to state in the interview that agreements between the two German states "and between the GDR and West Berlin Senat would be important contributions to improving the situation." A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on 5 November was more pointed, declaring that "no agreements concerning West Berlin's passenger and goods traffic can be concluded between the GDR and the FRG"; this matter "can be settled only by the GDR and the West Berlin Senat."

FRG-GDR            On 11 December ADN charged West Berlin Mayor Klaus  
CONTACTS           Schuetz with supporting the "illegal acts" of Bonn  
                     politicians--the "aggressive presence" of the CDU/  
CSU parliamentary faction and "other provocations" in West Berlin--  
in denouncing his "document" delivered that day to the office of  
the GDR Council of Ministers in East Berlin. Citing "informed  
sources," ADN noted that the document bore no address and no  
signature and called for a "gesture of good will" from the GDR.  
ADN did not indicate the substance of the Schuetz document,  
which according to the West German DPA calls for a "one-time"  
agreement allowing West Berliners to visit relatives and  
friends in the East during the coming holidays and asserts that  
this would not prejudice the four-power talks on West Berlin.

\* His interview came only four days after the ninth session of the talks. The communique on the session went beyond those on the previous and subsequent ones, declaring that "progress was achieved in some essential aspects of an agreement sought by the four powers." TASS and ADN accounts of the communique included the passage on "progress."

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ADN complained that Schuetz' "attitude" is not conducive to promoting the four-power talks and that he has "prevented relevant talks and settlements between the GDR Government and the West Berlin Senat." It concluded by urging Schuetz to contribute to the normalization of relations between the GDR and West Berlin, noting that the GDR has "repeatedly" declared its willingness to do so. Moscow media have not yet been heard to mention the Schuetz proposal.

Monitored GDR propaganda has not directly mentioned the FRG-GDR talks between state secretaries Bahr and Kohl since their last meeting on 27 November, when ADN released a joint statement on the meeting in which the two sides "agreed to continue the exchange of views." A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary the following day stated that if Bonn ceases its activity in West Berlin, which is "contrary to the city's status under international law . . . and infringes upon the interests of the GDR and other socialist states," the GDR Government "is prepared to enter into negotiations with the FRG Government on questions pertaining to the mutual transit of persons and goods." The paper repeated the argument that the USSR and the three Western powers have never recognized that West Berlin belongs to the FRG and urged Bonn to contribute to detente in Europe by ending its "disruptive policy" regarding West Berlin.

TRAFFIC            In the pattern of Ulbricht's 9 December speech, GDR  
SLOWDOWN        media have referred only obliquely to the traffic  
                 slowdown on the autobahns between West Berlin and  
the FRG which began on 28 November. ADN reported on 3 December that the Soviet embassy in East Berlin had rejected a protest from the Western Big Three against "the measures" taken by the GDR authorities in connection with the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction's meeting in West Berlin. In addition, the clandestine "German Freedom Station 904" on 3 December ridiculed the idea that Ulbricht was "to blame" for the West Berlin situation, asking rhetorically "who can blame the GDR if it reacts" to provocations.

The first monitored Soviet mention of the traffic slowdown came on 8 December in a Viktor Andreyev radio commentary beamed to Germany, two days before the 12th meeting of the four-power talks on West Berlin. Labeling the CDU/CSU meeting in West Berlin "provocative" and denying that "responsibility for the aggravation of the situation around West Berlin and the traffic routes leading to this city" rests with the GDR and the Soviet Union, Andreyev called the GDR authorities' actions "justified countermeasures."

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Moscow comment--including the Andreyev commentary and a 7 December TASS commentary by Kornilov on the Polish-FRG treaty--decry such "provocations" as the CDU/CSU meeting and FRG President Heinemann's 6-8 December visit to West Berlin at a time when negotiations are under way which might produce a "new outlook" toward West Berlin.

#### ULBRICHT GRUDGINGLY BACKS PACT LINE ON RAPPROCHEMENT WITH BONN

In reporting to the SED Central Committee on the outcome of the 2 December Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting, Ulbricht dutifully expressed support for the Pact's policy of promoting European detente and stated the GDR's willingness to negotiate with the West Germans. But his continuing suspicions about the implications of Bonn's Ostpolitik and some bitterness over his communist allies' reactions to it were clearly reflected in the address.

In explaining the Pact's decisions to his SED colleagues, Ulbricht drew heavily on the Pact Political Consultative Committee's statement on European security following the 2 December Berlin meeting, singling out passages that had seemed--against the background of speculation about Soviet-GDR discord--to project the image of a united bloc solidly backing the East Germans. Thus he paraphrased the statement's reference to the GDR's important role in Europe, the Pact members' commitment to uphold GDR sovereignty, and the call for GDR admission to the United Nations and other international organizations. Ulbricht followed the Pact line in noting that "new elements" have emerged in Europe, responsive to the coordinated political initiatives by the socialist states. In this context he dutifully cited Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw as contributions to European security but predictably saw their major significance in terms that have applicability for the GDR, praising them for recording "in terms of international law the realities that have emerged since World War II."

In a later passage he acknowledged that at the Berlin meeting he had "consented" to Warsaw's establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn, adding that "we are convinced that our positions correspond to the interests of the GDR people." But in an ensuing cryptic remark he seemed to imply that the treaty was a foregone conclusion and that he could do little else but consent: "Meanwhile, as is common knowledge, the Polish-West German treaty has been signed . . . ."

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In a gratuitous passage, Ulbricht seemed to register bitterness over Brandt's cordial reception in Warsaw. Polish media had given notably warm coverage to Brandt's statements and activities, larded with personal praise of Brandt for his display of "courage" in promoting European detente. Taking note of Brandt's gesture in kneeling before the memorial to the victims of the Warsaw ghetto, which Polish media had publicized, Ulbricht reminded the Poles that he had himself been among "the first Germans to bow their heads in reverence to the many millions of victims of fascist terror in Poland." Depicting the GDR as a loyal ally of Poland for more than 20 years, he also recalled that it was his regime which "concluded the first trade agreement and agreed on a joint GDR-Polish declaration on the Oder-Neisse line."

Ulbricht's discussion of the arguments for European detente advanced at the Pact's Berlin meeting seemed to betray his own reservations. Without identifying the speakers (although Ceausescu may have been one of those he had in mind), he said "it was repeatedly stressed" at the meeting that the socialist states were not the only ones interested in detente and that the FRG and some other NATO states and "even certain CDU quarters" are interested in an early implementation of the Moscow-Bonn and Warsaw-Bonn treaties. But this, he added, "does not prevent the CDU/CSU from attacking the Brandt-Scheel government with nationalist slogans, and it will not prevent them." As if to indicate that he had pressed this line at the Berlin meeting, he emphasized that the conference was "justified" in noting that "the policy pursued by the rightwing forces in the FRG and the United States could seriously harm the interests of the FRG and its citizens."

Ulbricht went beyond his Pact colleagues in reassuring his SED listeners that his assessment of Bonn's new Eastern policy "and its intention to penetrate the socialist countries by means of social democracy remains unchanged." This hardline statement was juxtaposed to his expression of the GDR's willingness to "strive to develop state relations on the basis of international law with the FRG within the meaning of peaceful coexistence." Sensitive to the possible domestic implications of even such a limited detente with Bonn, Ulbricht underscored the idea that the GDR would keep its ideological guard up to combat the "intensified anticommunist campaign emanating from political forces in Bonn."

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# MOSCOW, BLOC ALLIES CARRY SANITIZED ACCOUNTS OF ULBRICHT SPEECH

Soviet and East European sensitivity to Ulbricht's interpretation of the Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting and his hardline appraisal of Bonn's motives and policies is reflected in meager, sanitized coverage of the address. A relatively brief TASS account of the speech on 10 December sought to depict Ulbricht as an enthusiastic supporter of Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, at the same time standing firm--with the united support of his Pact allies--on his principled relations with the West Germans. Thus TASS quoted Ulbricht's approving comments on the treaties (largely paraphrases of the Warsaw Pact document) and ignored his bitter comments on Brandt's warm reception in Poland, his unchanged assessment of the dangers of Bonn's Ostpolitik, and his criticism of the Social Democrats, as well as his portrayal of an intensified anticommunist campaign emanating from Bonn.

TASS picked up Ulbricht's comments that the treaties between West Germany and the USSR and Poland introduced "new elements" into the European situation and created improved "conditions for the further struggle for peace and security in Europe," as well as his rejection of special "intra-German relations" short of diplomatic ties between two sovereign states. TASS also singled out Ulbricht's remark that if Bonn renounced its "illegal interference" in the affairs of West Berlin, this would undoubtedly open the way to an agreement on transport between the GDR and the FRG and would undoubtedly "have a positive effect" on the four-power talks.

Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, Prague's RUDE PRAVO, and Budapest's MAGYAR NEMZET similarly singled out this statement in their accounts of the speech. The Warsaw paper also said "the GDR is convinced, W. Ulbricht stressed, that there will be a discussion and negotiations with the FRG on the basis of international law." Predictably, TRYBUNA LUDU and the other East European bloc papers did not pick up Ulbricht's comments on Brandt's reception in Warsaw. MAGYAR NEMZET's report was unique in reporting the GDR leader's statement that his assessment of Bonn's Ostpolitik has not changed, but the Hungarian article as a whole depicted Ulbricht as a supporter of European detente.

Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, which usually awaits Moscow's cue on sensitive issues, limited itself to a 50-word BTA report noting only that the SED Central Committee met and was addressed by Ulbricht; BTA gave no details of the speech.

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Bucharest's SCIENTIA on 11 December reported Ulbricht's remarks in much the same way as the rest of the bloc; but in line with Romania's interest in promoting a European security conference, the paper stressed Ulbricht's statement that "there do not exist any objective motives for postponing the calling of the conference or for again demanding preliminary conditions."

# BUCHAREST, TIRANA PROVIDE OWN INTERPRETATIONS OF BERLIN SUMMIT

SCINTEIA      A frontpage article in SCINTEIA on 5 December by  
ARTICLE      Ion Fintinaru offered the Romanian public an  
                 authoritative interpretation of the Warsaw Pact's  
Berlin summit, depicting it as a contribution to European detente  
and in effect as a boost for Romania's own policy of pursuing  
increased contacts with the West.\* In contrast to the general  
Soviet bloc portrayal of the meeting as a demonstration of unity,  
Fintinaru said the session provided a forum for "a broad exchange  
of views" on international questions and again illustrated "the  
possibilities of reaching joint decisions through comradely talks . . . ,  
decisions which are meant to serve unity and internationalist  
solidarity." He went on to note that Ceausescu reasserted  
Romania's foreign policy principles and took "an active stand"  
on the questions examined at the meeting.

In passages that apparently reflect Ceausescu's efforts to push  
actively and seriously for European detente, Fintinaru stated  
that Romania's policy of normalizing interstate relations in  
Europe, particularly its establishment of diplomatic relations  
with Bonn in 1967, had contributed to "the positive course of  
political life in Europe, to the assertion of the realistic forces  
of the FRG, and to the development of interstate relations with  
the FRG." As if to assure the East Germans that Romania's increased  
ties with Bonn will not adversely affect its relations with the GDR,  
he added: "It is a well-known fact that Romania has consistently  
worked and continues to work for the normalization of all states'  
relations with the GDR . . . and nurtures feelings of profound  
sympathy for and solidarity with the GDR."

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\* SCINTEIA has frequently followed up major bloc meetings with  
signed articles by such leading political commentators as Fintinaru,  
explaining the event in terms of Romania's foreign policy orientation  
and in effect indicating that Bucharest maintained its independent  
line.

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In another passage evidently addressed to those members of the Soviet bloc who have reservations about Bonn's Ostpolitik, Pintinaru granted that enemies of detente and revanchist forces still exist in the West and in Bonn, but argued: "It is precisely for this reason that further actions must be taken to consolidate the position of the realistic forces promoting a policy of cooperation and to isolate the reactionary circles." In this context the article made a strong pitch for holding a European security conference, which it said would be "a major stage along the path of consolidating peace in Europe, without procrastination or prior conditions." Whether the conference takes place or not, the article seemed to imply, Romania "will continue to make its full contribution to the policy of promoting detente, trust, and inter-European cooperation, for the attainment of the vital desideratum of security in Europe."

**BASHKIMI ARTICLE** An article in the Albanian daily BASHKIMI on 7 December, entitled "Conspiracies and Intrigues Against the GDR," sought to make propaganda capital of the indications of discord between the GDR and its Pact allies. **BASHKIMI** said the Pact's Berlin meeting had been hurriedly convened to pressure the GDR into making "concessions on West Berlin," and it added that what Moscow asks of the East German people "is tantamount to surrender to the demands of the West German monopolies and their allies." Picturing the leaders of the GDR as reluctant to accede to Moscow's demands, the article said the Soviets "are loudly publicizing the possibility of the GDR's admission to the United Nations in exchange for concessions on West Berlin."

The article was also critical of the Poles, depicting them as "impatiently awaiting the signing of the Polish-West German treaty so that they can get the benefits of Bonn's credits."

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## CZECHOSLOVAK PLENUM

### MODERATE HUSAK LINE TAKES ON TOUGHER ANTI-RIGHTWING HUE

The plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) held on 10-11 December, after several reported postponements, generally confirmed Husak's moderate course but gave scant comfort to elements hoping for a possible softening of pressure on "the right wing." While announcing no intensified purge, the plenum's resolution on "party unity" was pointedly orthodox in identifying the right wing as still "the main political danger."

The plenum confined itself to one expulsion from the party but selected for this action a prominent symbol in the person of former Premier Cernik. Without elaboration, as reported by the Prague domestic service on the 13th, the plenum "confirmed the expulsion of Oldrich Cernik from the ranks of CPCZ members." Unlike Dubcek, Cernik had not gone through the intermediate stage of having his party membership "suspended" before he was finally expelled. Bearing a less liberal image than Dubcek, he had been kept on as premier until January 1970, when he was replaced by Strougal.

The only other announced personnel change was the removal of moderately conservative Frantisek Penc from the CPCZ Secretariat, "in connection with being entrusted with other tasks," and his replacement on the Secretariat by the more conservative Oldrich Svestka. In what may reflect a further downgrading of the federative system, Svestka, currently chief editor of the Czech Party Bureau weekly TRIBUNA, was removed as Secretary of the Czech Party Bureau in connection with his promotion to the CPCZ Secretariat. In the compromise settlement worked out in Moscow in August 1968, Svestka had been dropped as chief editor of RUDE PRAVO and lost the CPCZ Secretariat membership that went with the editorial post. He now returns to that body with the more prestigious designation of "Secretary and member of the CPCZ Central Committee Secretariat."

Penc's "other tasks" were clarified on the 14th when the Prague radio reported that President Svoboda had nominated him as Czechoslovak ambassador to Poland. The broadcast said Penc was received that day by Husak and Strougal and that Husak thanked him "for the work he had done as Secretary of the party Central Committee."

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HUSAK SPEECH

As presented in a lengthy summary by CTK on 14 December, Husak's main address at the 10 December session of the plenum\* emerges on balance as a hardline statement for the CPCZ First Secretary, although it includes some characteristically conciliatory assurances to liberal elements. In passages carried by CTK as direct quotations, Husak declared that "the rightwing danger continues to remain the chief danger, and the struggle against it is the major front in our political battle." He characterized the period since his accession to leadership of the party in April 1969 as one of "fierce struggle of Marxist-Leninist, left forces of our party against rightist opportunism." Downgrading the idea of compromise, Husak went on to say that "we may be patient and sensitive with regard to confused individuals, but we must not tolerate opportunist, revisionist views and groups within the party and activities of antisocialist forces in society, because that would be the seed of new problems and new crises." He added that there would be no toleration of "revisionist subversion in whatever 'reformatory' guise."

Reporting on the results of the January-September 1970 "exchange of party membership cards," Husak said 326,817 persons had been dropped from the CPCZ since the start of this year, amounting to a 21.67 percent drop in membership during that period. At the same time, he appeared to give a positive cast to the whole period since the start of the 1968 reforms in noting that "since 1 January 1968" party membership had decreased by 475,731, or 28 percent. Husak stressed at the same time that despite the reduction in party ranks--which still leaves the CPCZ as proportionately the largest of the European ruling parties, constituting almost 10 percent of the country's population--the CPCZ "remains a mass party" with "approximately 1.2 million members."

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\* The speech was first summarized briefly by CTK and the Prague domestic radio on the day it was delivered. CTK's lengthy summary four days later was finally followed, on 15 December, by what appears to be a text in RUDE PRAVO. The RUDE PRAVO version, while couched in the first person and suggestive of full text by its length, is not labeled "text." It is not yet available in full translation.

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The speech included a characteristic assurance that a "differentiated, individual approach" would be used toward "the former members of the party" expelled in the card exchange. Husak urged that the party "support the development" of former members' "working initiative" and "gradually, according to the results of their efforts, to make it possible for them to take part in public affairs." He went on to urge the winning over of "all honest members of the intelligentsia," adding that this task would be difficult and complex because a "considerable" part of the intelligentsia "was under the influence of various radical, aggressive groups of rightists" who were "mostly" recruited from the intelligentsia's own ranks.

The CPCZ leader stuck to his moderate line in stressing that the party's recent difficulties stem from the Novotny era--the period following the 13th CPCZ Congress in 1966--as well as from the period after January 1968. He noted in this connection that a document submitted for "discussion and approval" by the plenum was entitled "Lesson Drawn From the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Party Congress." That document is not mentioned in TASS' 14 December report of the documents adopted by the CPCZ plenum, and the fairly brief TASS report of Husak's speech carried in PRAVDA on the 10th ignored his reference to the 13th congress as well as his conciliatory remarks on the expelled party members and the intelligentsia.

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## POLISH RIOTS

### WARSAW COMMUNIQUE ACKNOWLEDGES TWO-DAY OUTBREAK IN GDANSK

The Warsaw domestic service at 1500 GMT on 16 December "acquainted" listeners with the contents of a "communique issued by PAP," according to which "on 14 and 15 December, in Gdansk, serious street incidents took place." These were the first public disturbances acknowledged in Polish media since the student riots in Warsaw and other Polish cities in March 1968, in the wake of the Czechoslovak liberal reforms. The disturbances are attributed to "hooligan" elements, as in 1968, but their more serious nature is registered in the communique's report that "six persons were killed."

The communique's circuitous explanation of the circumstances of the riots--triggered, according to Western news sources, by a rise in food prices--is that "making use of the situation created among the workers of the Gdansk Shipyard, adventurist and hooligan movements, which have nothing in common with the working classes, demolished and burned several public buildings and robbed several dozen shops." It goes on to say that "murder has been committed" against members of the militia who intervened to restore order and that there were "also many seriously wounded." While claiming that the "adventurist" elements have been defeated and public order restored, the communique adds a warning that the authorities "will react with all firmness to all disruption of public order and to all antistate actions."

Some two and a half hours before the Warsaw domestic service report, a partially intelligible item monitored on 1,304 kilocycles, the frequency normally used by Gdansk radio, informed inhabitants of the "Tri-Cities" (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot) that "in connection with yesterday's events, all necessary steps" were being taken to restore order. Unlike the PAP communique, this broadcast appeared to jibe with Western news reports that the disturbances were affecting other coastal cities besides Gdansk.

The March 1968 student riots had been followed by announced dismissals of high officials in economic ministries, many of

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whom were parents of the rioters, and regime statements stressed the "Zionist" aspect of those disturbances. Some 10 days after the initial outbreak, Gomulka delivered a defensive, conciliatory speech on the subject which was punctuated by heckling from his audience.

Moscow's domestic service carried the text of the PAP communique on the Gdansk riots four hours after Warsaw media first reported it.

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## SPAIN

### MOSCOW PROTESTS SPANISH TRIAL OF "BASQUE PATRIOTS"

In an unusual amount of propaganda attention to a Spanish event, Soviet media have been publicizing protests and demonstrations in Spain, the Soviet Union, and throughout Europe in support of the defendants in Spain's "shameful trial of 16 Basque patriots." Since the military trial of the "patriotic democrats" began on 3 December, Moscow has reported protest activities by the Spanish, French, Italian, and West German communist parties, a large number of Soviet organizations, and groups in Chile, Finland, and Venezuela.

A statement by the Soviet Jurists Association, carried in Moscow's domestic service on the 11th, charged that "torture and ill treatment" of the defendants and "terrorizing of the defense" by the "ignominious tribunal" constituted "a violation of the generally accepted principles of the United Nations." Soviet violinist Oistrakh, according to TASS on the 15th, cancelled his planned December tour of Spain in protest against the trial and "the arbitrary actions of the Spanish authorities": "I cannot go to Spain where young workers and students are on trial there with six of them facing a death penalty."

A PRAVDA commentary on the 7th characterized the trial as "an attempt of the Spanish authorities to suppress wide popular actions for democratic and social progress"; TASS commentator Kornilov on the 8th said it "recreates the darkest, grimmest pages of the medieval Spanish Inquisition"; and TASS on the 10th called the trial "a screen to cover persecution of civil rights fighters." The Spanish Government's 14 December decision to suspend the personal liberties of all Spaniards for six months was noted on the following day in Moscow's domestic service, which commented that "the authorities are obviously preparing the ground for the announcement of stiff sentences and for trying to meet head-on the inevitable fresh wave of popular indignation."

More than a third of Moscow's comment on the Basque trial has linked it with the Angela Davis case in the United States. Typically, a 15 December PRAVDA article alleged that "the brutal repressions against freedom fighters" such as Angela Davis and the 16 "Basque patriots" have "evoked a wave of wrathful protests by the Soviet public and millions of upright people in the whole world."

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Monitored Soviet media have not mentioned the kidnapping of a West German consul in Spain on 1 December--an action for which the Basque Nationalist Movement claims credit, warning that the fate of the consul will depend upon that of the 16 Basques on trial. Moscow has, however, registered sensitivity to the implications of such actions by going on record in opposition to kidnapping as a matter of policy. An 11 December TASS report on a Paris session of European Council foreign ministers, in which the West Germans participated, noted that "the problem of defending diplomats against kidnapping" was on the agenda. A 12 December domestic service broadcast on the recent kidnappings in Canada cited "the inability of the terrorist tactics and the recent violence to solve the fundamental issues of the struggle for social justice" in Canada and contended that terrorist actions "would bring no advantages even to the terrorists themselves and can be very dangerous to the country's democratic forces."

#### PEKING SEES TRIAL AS BEGINNING OF END FOR FRANCO

Peking propaganda has viewed the strikes and protests in Spain surrounding the trial of the Basques as the start of "a large-scale struggle against fascist persecution and for democratic rights" which has "violently shaken the fascist dictatorial rule of Franco." NCNA on the 13th chronicled events in Spain in protest against the trial and related the allegedly "bestial persecution" of the defendants by "the reactionary court." Alleging that "a vigorous massive struggle against the fascist Franco regime has broken out in Spain," a signed article in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 14th predicted that "the day is not far off when the reactionary Franco rule is put to an end."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SOVIET EDITORIALS DIVERGE ON INDUSTRIAL PRIORITIES

Signs of high-level discord over economic policy are evident in divergent press treatment of the 1971 economic plan unveiled at the recently concluded USSR Supreme Soviet session. The divergences concern priorities within heavy industry, rather than between heavy industry and other sectors of the economy. Presumably, the policy differences arise from the squeeze on resources created by the decision to maintain defense expenditures at a high level, to increase allocations to agriculture in the new five year plan, and to continue to increase consumer goods production at higher rates than producer goods in 1971.

The divergences are reflected in different listings of branches of industry that are said to promote technological progress and are scheduled to receive preferential treatment in the 1971 plan. In his report to the Supreme Soviet on 8 December, Gosplan chief N. K. Baybakov gave the following listing: "electric power, machine building, chemical, petrochemical, oil, and gas." These branches of industry, he stated, are scheduled to grow more rapidly than industry as a whole in 1971 (PRAVDA, 9 December).

Baybakov's listing is contradicted by the editorials in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 12 December, following the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet session. PRAVDA's editorial, which echoes the sentiments of the so-called "metal-eaters," identifies the favored branches of industry as follows: "in the first place ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, oil, coal, chemical, electrotechnical, machine building, and electric power." IZVESTIYA provides a different listing, which is more in line with Baybakov's: "electric power, gas, chemical, petrochemical, and machine building."

These divergences are particularly noteworthy because both editorials draw heavily from the verbatim text of Baybakov's report. Moreover, the authoritative nature of the report is beyond question; before delivery to the Supreme Soviet, it was cleared by the USSR Council of Ministers (early November), a joint meeting of the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet (12 November), the Presidium of the trade union hierarchy (13 November), and the CPSU Central Committee plenum (7 December).

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As if to paper over these divergences, IZVESTIYA on 13 December reprinted PRAVDA's editorial of the 12th in its entirety, as did all other central papers of the 13th. This belated and unprecedented exercise in "monolithic unity" merely served, however, to underscore the disarray already exposed.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## HUNAN FIRST TO ESTABLISH PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE

China's first reconstructed party committee at the provincial level was announced for Hunan, Mao's home province, on 14 December. The NCNA account, widely publicized by Radio Peking and in the press, reported that the committee was elected at a provincial party congress convened from 24 November to 4 December and attended by 920 delegates.

Following a mass visit to Shaoshan, Mao's birthplace, the delegates "discussed and approved" the report of the provincial party core group and then proceeded to elect the new party committee of 75 full members and 15 alternates. The new committee immediately held a plenary session to select its three top leaders. With the approval of the CCP Central Committee, Hua Kuo-feng was named first secretary, Pu Chan-ya secretary, and Yang Ta-yi deputy secretary of the new committee. Prior to the cultural revolution, Hunan's party committee was headed by a 13-man hierarchy of first and second secretaries followed by several secretaries and alternate secretaries as well as ordinary members.

Hua, a veteran party secretary of the old provincial committee, has been acting chairman of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. NCNA now also identifies him for the first time as acting head of the provincial party core group. Although Hua is a civilian, the PLA is strongly represented within the leadership of the new committee. Both Yang and Pu hold key positions within the Hunan Military District as well as vice chairmanships on the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee. The NCNA account praises the new party committee for its faith and reliance on "the PLA and the great majority of the cadres."

Pu Chan-ya spoke at the congress on behalf of the provincial party committee and cautioned the party representatives of local workers, peasants, leading cadres, and PLA units in attendance as well as the newly elected committee members to "guard against arrogance and keep in close contact with the masses" in order to advance their ideological revolutionization.

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Hunan, which reported the first rebuilt county-level committee in the nation a year ago, has led other provinces in rebuilding the party at and below the county level. A Changsha broadcast of 4 December, which for the first time indicated that a "great majority" of basic-level party branches and a "majority" of counties in Hunan have set up new party committees, was echoed in the NCNA report on the new provincial committee.

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES      The first rebuilt city committee for a provincial capital was indicated by the Chekiang provincial radio on 8 December. The broadcast referred to the Hangchow municipal party committee in a report on the need for Hangchow's leading cadres to continue their study of Mao's works.

On 9 December Nanking radio reported the re-establishment of a city municipal party committee for Wuhsi, a major Kiangsu city. The committee was formed after a party congress met in the city from 21 to 27 November. The report identified Hsu Shih-yu, chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee and commander of the Nanking Military Region, as head of the provincial party core group for the first time. Yang Kuang-li was also identified as a member of the party core group. Yang holds concurrent positions as vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and deputy director of the political department of the Nanking Military Region.

Finally, Hofei radio on 13 December referred in passing to a municipal party committee for Wuhu, a city in Anhwei Province.

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## NEW PARTY COMMITTEES AT COUNTY OR HIGHER LEVEL

<u>Provincial- level Unit</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Party Committees: District</u>	<u>Province</u>
Anhwei	6	2		
Chekiang	18	1		
Fukien	4			
Kiangsi	7			
Kiangsu	10	1		
Shanghai	3			
Shantung				
Honan	14			
Hunan	21			+
Hupei	5			
Kwangsi	1			
Kwangtung	15	1		
Hopeh				
Inner Mongolia				
Peking				
Shansi				
Tientsin				
Heilungkiang	15	1		
Kirin	5			
Liaoning	2		1	
Kansu	7			
Ningsia	3			
Shensi	1			
Sinkiang	4			
Tibet				
Kweichow				
Szechwan				
Tibet				
Yunnan				

Note: Information is as derived primarily from provincial radio broadcasts; some new committees are reported also in the central media. No provincial broadcasts are carried by the radios of Inner Mongolia, Kweichow, and Szechwan.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### MOSCOW KEEPS ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSAL ALIVE

Soviet spokesmen have kept alive, with little elaboration, Moscow's concept of an eventual Asian collective security arrangement as first proposed by Brezhnev in a 7 June 1969 speech at the international party conference in Moscow. Professing a desire to see such a system embrace "all" Asian countries and assuring the Chinese that the proposed system is not directed against the PRC, the Soviets have enunciated some preconditions for the establishment of the system which place it implicitly in a post-Vietnam context.

The need for an Asian collective security system continues to be reaffirmed periodically in general terms in Soviet leaders' speeches and in routine propaganda. A typical recent reference appeared in a 19 November IZVESTIYA article by the paper's authoritative commentator Matveyev, broadcast only in Vietnamese by Radio Moscow. In the course of a general discussion of Southeast Asia, Matveyev claimed that the Soviet proposal "is gaining increasingly broad support in Asia" but cautioned that "of course, its practical implementation requires much effort." Low-key, passing references to the Asian security theme have recurred sporadically in Moscow broadcasts, particularly in Mandarin to Southeast Asia and in Japanese.

In discussing the "longer-term task" of creating "a system of collective security in areas of the globe where the danger of another world war, of armed conflicts, is concentrated," Brezhnev had said in his 7 June 1969 speech that "the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia." Foreign Minister Gromyko, who has been the principal spokesman for the proposal, followed up in his 10 July 1969 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet, stating that the proposal required serious study as well as discussion and consultation among the interested states. Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1969, Gromyko again raised the issue of creating "an effective system of collective security in Asia" and urged that "all the states in the region"

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give thought to and work for its creation. In his 21 October 1970 speech at the current UNGA session Gromyko made a passing reference to the proposal, noting that "general support is being given to the principled approach on which our proposal is based" and that the plan provides for "participation in Asian regional cooperation by all the Asian states."

#### PRECONDITIONS SUGGEST POST-VIETNAM TIME FRAME

Matveyev, anticipating Brezhnev's proposal, had suggested in IZVESTIYA as early as 29 May 1969 that "the liquidation of foreign military bases" in Southeast Asia would furnish "the prerequisites for creating bases of collective security." And references to the proposal in the past half-year have reinforced the impression of a long-term project envisaged for the post-Vietnam period.

The first specification of preconditions for establishment of the system proposed by Brezhnev appeared in the 19 July 1970 communique signed by the CPSU and Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) following the visit of a JSP delegation to Moscow. In the communique the CPSU unilaterally reaffirmed "its readiness to strive to create a system of collective security in Asia" and stated that "the first step on this path must be the cessation of imperialist aggression in Asia and the withdrawal of American troops from this region." A Tokyo press report of the talks cited Suslov for the further prerequisite of "cancellation of the collective and bilateral security pacts against the socialist forces in Asia and the Pacific region," but this was not reported in Soviet media.

In a 14 August speech in Pyongyang, Mazurov said that the implementation of an Asian collective security system "presupposes" an end to "imperialist" aggression in Asia and the withdrawal of U.S. forces "and the forces of the U.S. accomplices" from the territory of the Asian countries. This demand for withdrawal of the forces of U.S. allies was repeated in the same context in Soviet broadcasts to Japan in September.

#### REFERENCES TO MEMBERSHIP IN SYSTEM

Moscow has on occasion denied that the proposed system is directed against the PRC and in at least one instance has suggested that the United States could be a party to it. In his 10 July 1969 speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet,



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Gromyko branded as "absolutely groundless inventions" the "insinuation" of "certain circles" that the proposal was "directed against some single country or group of countries." He said the Soviet concept assumed the collective efforts "of all Asian states."

Similarly, IZVESTIYA's Matveyev in an article on 3 August 1969 denied that the Soviet proposal was a question of the "encirclement of China" and chided the Chinese leaders by recalling that in the past they had "repeatedly expressed themselves in favor of the creation of a collective security system in the Pacific Basin and in the Far East."\* In an interview published in Tokyo's YOMIURI on 6 April 1970, Podgorny stated that the proposed system "cannot be directed against any country or group of countries."

Although Malik in a 28 October 1969 speech to the UNGA's First Committee said "it is self-evident that only states that belong to a given geographical region can take final decisions concerning the possibility and expediency of building up regional security systems," thus seemingly excluding the United States, the idea of U.S. participation seemed to be entertained in an 18 November 1969 speech in Tokyo by Professor Georgiy P. Zadorozhnyy of the USSR International Affairs Research Institute. As reported on 19 November by the Tokyo YOMIURI, which characterized the speech as "a trial balloon" launched by Soviet authorities, Zadorozhnyy stated that although the Soviet-proposed Asian collective security organ would be "a pan-Asian organ embracing all Asian nations" and "the United States is not an Asian nation," the United States nevertheless "has interests in Asia" and therefore "should participate in the organ." Soviet media did not report the speech.

There has been no complete enumeration of other potential participants in the proposed system, but Soviet spokesmen have suggested that its membership would consist of nations stretching from Japan through Southeast Asia to Turkey. As quoted in YOMIURI, Zadorozhnyy stated that Australia, New Zealand, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey "would be allowed to join

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\* In his 20th CPSU Congress speech in February 1956, Khrushchev had welcomed Chou En-lai's August 1954 proposal for a collective peace pact in Asia. In his October 1960 speech before the UN General Assembly, Khrushchev endorsed Chou En-lai's August 1960 proposal for a "peaceful nonaggression pact between the Asian countries and the countries of the Pacific coast," specifically including the United States.

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the organ." Commenting that "the Middle East is also Asia if one discounts, of course, North Africa," a participant in a 17 August 1969 Radio Moscow commentators' roundtable mentioned Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran.

#### SYSTEM NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY AFFAIRS

While Soviet media have carried no suggestion as to either the organizational structure or the substance of the proposed Asian collective security system, indications of possible Soviet thinking have appeared in the Japanese press. Tokyo's JIJI on 5 September 1969 reported that Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi that the plan "was not military in character" but "also included economic cooperation." In his April 1970 interview with YOMIURI, Podgornyy similarly played down the military aspect of the proposed system in asserting that it could provide for a wide, mutually advantageous "political, economic, and cultural cooperation" among the participants.

Zadorozhnyy made the only intimations as to the organizational structure of the system in his 18 November speech in Tokyo when he reportedly said that "it would be necessary" to establish a general assembly, security council, and expert committees; that each member nation would have one vote in the assembly, which would elect the council members; and that "an international conference" would determine which "big nations" would become "standing directors" of the council and how many "non-standing directors" would be appointed.

#### MOSCOW CLAIMS FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL

Apart from general claims that the proposal has met with "great support and understanding" from the peoples of Southeast Asia, Soviet media have occasionally cited instances of support from specific countries. For instance, a panelist in the 17 August 1969 Radio Moscow roundtable program noted that "many utterances by distinguished figures" supporting the Brezhnev proposal included statements by leaders of India and Malaysia. NEW TIMES (No. 40, Russian edition, 2 October 1970), citing a TASS interview with Singapore's Prime Minister Le Kuan Yew, recorded him as "viewing with interest the possibility of ensuring collective security in Asia."

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#### PRC DENOUNCES SCHEME AS ANTI-CHINA PLOT

Chinese comment on the Brezhnev proposal has depicted it as a Soviet effort to intrude into Asian affairs and to form an anti-China coalition of Asian nations. Chou En-lai promptly attacked the proposal on 13 June 1969 as a new step in Moscow's efforts to create "a new anti-China military alliance" and warned Asian countries not to abandon their independence by participating in Soviet schemes for regional economic cooperation. NCNA on 25 July 1969 branded the proposal "an anti-China, anti-people, counterrevolutionary burlesque staged by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique by conjuring up the ghost of John Foster Dulles" and his SEATO system.

Although Chinese media heavily attacked the proposal in this vein throughout the summer of 1969, there has been only occasional mention of it in recent months in line with Peking's general polemical restraint toward the Soviets. Thus a 3 September 1970 joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY and the LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, attacking Soviet flirtations with the Japanese, accused "the social imperialists" of wooing "Japanese militarism" to "rig up a so-called 'Asian collective security system' against China, against communism, against the people and against the revolution." Describing the proposal as a Soviet scheme "to undermine the friendly relations between China and Pakistan," an NCNA correspondent's dispatch from Rawalpindi on 24 September recalled that this "vain attempt to carry out anti-China criminal activities" under the signboard of regional economic cooperation "was firmly boycotted by the Pakistan people."

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